四、教學方式(Teaching Method)

The course will offer an introductory lecture followed by weekly two hour seminars. These seminars will utilise a mix of teaching methods involving a workshop format, small group work, presentations and case study analysis. Each seminar will be led by a student presentation. There are no pre-requisites for this course.

五、教學進度(Syllabus)

Week 1: Background

1. McGinnis and Walker (2010), “Foundations of the Ostrom Workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity,

   and self-governance,” Public Choice 143: 293-301.

2. Elinor Ostrom, Selections from Fall 2011 Syllabus for Political Science Y673.

3. Elinor Ostrom (2010), “A Long Polycentric Journey,” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 13: 1-23.

4. McGinnis and E. Ostrom (2012), “Reflections on Vincent Ostrom, Public Administration, and Polycentricity,”

   PAR 12(1): 15-25.

5. Michael D. McGinnis (2011). “Elinor Ostrom: Politics as Problem-Solving in Polycentric Settings,” in Donatella

   Campus, Gianfranco Pasquino, and Martin Bull, eds., Maestri of Political Science, volume 2, Colchester,

   UK: ECPR Press, pp. 137-158.

6. Singer (2015), “The Indian States of America: Parallel Universes & Overlapping Sovereignty,” Amer. Indian L.

   Rev. 38: 1-33.

Week 2: Social ontology: of things and institutions

1. Searle (1998), “Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society,” Analyse&Kritik S.143-158.

2. Denzau& North (1994), “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,” Kyklos47: 3-31.

3. V. Ostrom (1980), “Artisanship and Artifact,” PAR 40: 309-317.

4. Searle (2005), “What is an institution?” J. Inst. Econ. 1: 1-22.

5. North (1994), “Economic Performance through Time,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 84: 359-368.

6. Coase (1992), “The Industrial Structure of Production,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 82: 713-719.

7. Crawford and E. Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” Amer. Poli. Sci. Rev. 89: 582-600.

8. E. Ostrom (1986), “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions,” Public Choice 48: 3-25.

Week 3: Governance institutions: law and/or social norms

1. Pound (1940-41), “What is Law?” W. Va. L. Q. 47: 1-12.

2. Holmes (1896-97), “The Path of the Law,” Boston L. School Mag. 1: 1-17.

3. Llewellyn (1949), “Law and the Social Sciences,” Amer. Socio. Rev. 14:451-462.

4. Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990), “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant,

   Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs,” Econ. And Pol. 2: 1-23.

5. Ellickson (1986), “Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County,” Stanford L.

 Rev. 38: 623-687.

6. R. Posner (1997), “Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 87: 365-369.

7. Jolls and Sunstein (2006), “Debiasing through Law,” J. Leg. Stud. 35: 199-242.

Week 4: Commons dilemmas, rational actors, and collective action

1. Arrow (1986), “Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System,” J. Bus. 59: S385-S399.

2. Simon (1972), “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” in C.B. McGuire and R. Rander (eds) Decision and

   Organization, Dordrecht: North-Holland.

3. Cave (1987) “Introduction to Game Theory” RAND Graduate School.

4. Edney and Harper (1978), “The Commons Dilemma: A Review of Contributions from Psychology,”

Envt’l Mgt. 2: 491-507.

5. E. Ostrom (1988), “Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma,” in V. Ostrom, Feeney, and Ficht

   (eds), Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development. SF: ICS Press, pp. 103-139.

6. Cole & Grossman (2010), “Institutions matter! Why the Herder Problem is not a Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Theory

   and Decision 69: 219-231.

7. Nowak (2006), “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation,” Sci.